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Involuntary Activation of
Reservists
By NEIL J. DILLoFF*
There is a club held over the heads of thousands of inactive
duty armed forces reserve personnel. It is poised, ready to fall
on those "drilling" reservists who fail to meet their reserve
obligations satisfactorily. The club was created by the United
States Congress and is found in 10 U.S.C. § 673a.' This statute
imposes the threat of involuntary activation-a call to active
duty for a period not to exceed 24 months.' The obligations
which must be met by the reservist to avoid the impact of
activation consist of attendance at weekly drill meetings and
*A.B., 1970, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., 1973, Georgetown Univ.
Law Center. Member of the Maryland and Pennsylvania Bars. The author is presently
serving with the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the United States Navy. Views
expressed in this article must be considered as those of the individual author and do
not purport to promulgate or voice the views of the Judge Avocate General of the Navy,
the Department of the Navy, or any other agency or department of the United States.
10 U.S.C. §673a (1971). It appears as follows:
§ 673a. Ready Reserve: members not assigned to or participating satisfactorily in,
units
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may order
to active duty any member of the Ready Reserve of an armed force who-
(1) is not assigned to, or participating satisfactorily in, a unit of
the Ready Reserve;
(2) has not fulfilled his statutory reserve obligation; and
(3) has not served on active duty for a total of 24 months.
(b) A member who is ordered to active duty under this section may be
required to serve on active duty until his total service on active duty equals
24 months. If his enlistment or other period of military service would expire
before he has served the required period under this section, it may be ex-
tended until he has served the required period.
(c) To achieve fair treatment among members of the Ready Reserve who
are being considered for active duty under this section, appropriate consider-
ation shall be given to-
(1) family responsibilities; and
(2) employment necessary to maintain the national health,
safety, or interest.
For the legislative history and purpose of the statute, see 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1308.
2 10 U.S.C. §673a(b) (1971).
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participation in an annual period of active duty training,
known affectionately to the reservist as "summer camp." Since
the statute's enactment in June 1967, its implementation and
enforcement have produced extensive litigation in the federal
courts. This article will first discuss the cases arising under 10
U.S.C. § 673a, and will then address the policy questions of
whether the remedy of active duty is purely "administrative,"
as it purports to be, and whether the remedy is a proper one.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND THE ACTIVATION PROCESS
There are two statutes which deal directly with the activa-
tion of reservists. The first, 10 U.S.C. § 673, involves the mobi-
lization of entire reserve units during a national emergency,
and will not be discussed here. The second, 10 U.S.C. § 673a,
provides for the purportedly "administrative" sanction im-
posed when a reservist fails to perform his reserve obligation
satisfactorily. The remedy provided is a call to active duty,
limited to that period of time required to bring the reservist's
total active duty service to a period of 24 months.3 The statute
provides that "appropriate consideration shall be given to (1)
family responsibilities; and (2) employment necessary to main-
tain the national health, safety, or interest."4 It is this activa-
tion statute that has produced the litigation to be discussed.
Each of the armed services has implemented 10 U.S.C. §
673a in basically the same manner.5 Generally, the sequential
elements of the activation process are as follows: an accrual by
the reservist of five or more unsatisfactory drill performances
in a 1-year period (but only one absence activates the process
in the Marine Corps Reserve) ;' a notice to the reservist that his
3Id.
Id. § 673a(c).
See Department of Defense Directive (hereinafter cited as DOD Directive)
1215.13, issued Nov. 1, 1972, 38 Fed. Reg. 3043 (1973). The individual services have
promulgated their own procedures under DOD Directive 1215.13 as follows: (a) Marine
Corps Reserve Standing Operating Procedures (hereinafter RESSOP), MCO P 1001 R.
43 of June 19, 1964, as modified by Commandant of the Marine Corps Message 0
11724Z of March 31, 1971; (b) Chief of Naval Personnel Instruction 5400.42C (enclo-
sure 28) of Oct. 20, 1970; (c) Army Regulation (hereinafter AR) 135-91; and (d) Air
Force Manual 35-3, Ch. 41 and Air National Guard Regulation 39-10.
6 This element can also be satisfied by a reservist's absence from a substantial
portion of his required annual training period, which is usually of a two-week duration.
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performance is unsatisfactory; a recommendation by the unit
commander that the reservist be called to active duty; a deter-
mination by higher authority that the reservist be activated in
accordance with the commander's recommendation and pur-
suant to the statute; and, finally, the issuance of orders to the
reservist directing him to report to active duty.
II. A SURVEY OF THE CASE LAW
10 U.S.C. § 673a has spawned in excess of 60 federal court
cases involving claims made by reservists attempting to avoid
active duty. This number of cases is remarkable in light of the
fact that the statute is less than a decade old. This mass of case
law can be divided into three discernible categories. The first
two are based on the nature of the claim asserted by the reserv-
ist, including cases dealing with due process claims and cases
involving alleged enlistment contract violations. The third cat-
egory is characterized by a variety of procedural devices relied
on by some courts to avoid addressing the reservist's claim on
the merits.
A. Alleged Violations of Due Process
Due process violations have been the primary focus of at-
tack by reservists challenging their involuntary activation. The
allegations include: (1) the lack of proper notice to the reserv-
ists, at various stages in the activation process; (2) the failure
to provide a formal hearing prior to activation; (3) the failure
of the service to comply with its own regulations; (4) the ab-
sence or denial of a right to appeal the activation; and (5) the
failure of the service to consider the family responsibilities of
the reservist as required by the statute. Each of these due
process claims will be discussed separately.
1. Improper and Insufficient Notice
The leading notice case, which has been extensively cited
by courts in subsequent decisions, is the Second Circuit deci-
sion of Fox v. Brown.7 Fox was a member of the Air National
402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969).
19751
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Guard who was contesting his activation orders. One conten-
tion was that he was not given sufficient time to wind up his
affairs between his actual notice, claimed to have been received
on June 7, 1968, and his reporting date of July 1, 1968. This
claim was based on 10 U.S.C. § 672(e), which states:
A reasonable time shall be allowed between the date
when a Reserve ordered to active duty. . . is alerted for that
duty and the date when he is required to enter upon that
duty. Unless the Secretary concerned determines that the
military requirements do not allow it, this period shall be at
least 30 days.
The court, in rejecting Fox's argument, ruled that notice was
effectively received on October 18, 1967, when Fox learned of
his activation. The court went on to note that, even accepting
Fox's argument, the most he could have obtained was a report-
ing date of July 7, 1968. Thus, the case stands for the
proposition that "last-minute" notice is valid and not violative
of due process of law.
In a subsequent case involving allegations of insufficient
notice, the reservist sought an injunction against his activation
as well as a declaratory judgment that his orders were void. He
asserted that he was physically present for all of his required
drills, but was counted absent due to his unmilitary appear-
ance (long hair). The Army conceded that he was marked ab-
sent from the fifth drill "because of the appearance he pre-
sented during a formal unit inspection," but stated that such
procedure was authorized by the Army regulations."0 The dis-
trict court, in rejecting the reservist's contention that he had
not received sufficient warning of the consequences of being
marked absent, held, inter alia, that the reservist had no valid
due process claim under the fifth amendment." It so held be-
'Id. at 841.
320 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1971).
10 Id. at 1243. AR 135-91 (5) (d) (2) states:
A member present at a scheduled unit training assembly will not receive
credit for attendance thereat unless he is in the prescribed uniform, presents
a neat and soldierly appearance, and performs his assigned duties in a satis-
factory manner as determined by the unit commander.
" 320 F. Supp. at 1246.
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cause the plaintiff had been provided written notice, by
certified mail, after each absence and had been told the possi-
ble consequences if five absences were accrued. The notice sent
to the plaintiff also informed him of a challenge procedure, and
the court noted that "[o]n none of the five occasions did peti-
tioner make any attempt to challenge the accuracy of the mili-
tary entries .... "12
Lack of notice was at least one factor that led to the grant-
ing of a petition for habeas corpus and an order that the reserv-
ist be restored to reserve status in Horn v. Musick."3 The Army
was cited by an Ohio federal district court for a dual infraction
of its own procedures in that it neither notified the reservist of
his call to active duty, nor informed him of his right to appeal.
The petitioner claimed that the first notice he received oc-
curred when he was arrested by the local sheriff for being ab-
sent without leave (AWOL). Although he was told by his com-
manding officer that activation was going to be recommended,
the court held that this, standing alone, was not sufficient no-
tice.'4 The court concluded that the Army has to give notice,
apparently in writing, that orders transferring the reservist to
active duty are being issued.
Probably the most explicit case on due process notice re-
quirements is United States ex rel. Moravetz v. Resor.'5 This
was an action seeking a writ of habeas corpus in which the
petitioner was not notified that his absences from drill were
excessive until he received a registered letter, some four days
after his last purported absence, stating that he had accumu-
lated more than the permitted number of unexcused absences.
The court found that the Army had not complied with Army
Regulation 135-91,11 and stated flatly: "Due process requires
12 Id.
13 347 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
U Id. at 1308.
, 349 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Minn. 1972).
' Id. at 1184. AR 135-91 (12) (e) requires a three-step notice procedure: (1) the
reservist must be contacted in person if possible, and furnished a letter of instruction
outlining the member's obligation to participate satisfactorily; (2) if it is impractical
to establish personal contact, the reservist must be furnished a letter of instruction by
certified mail, delivered to addressee only, return receipt requested; and (3) a copy of
the letter of instruction and the Post Office receipt, if applicable, are to be filed in the
member's Military Personnel Records Jacket.
19751
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that the Army follow its own regulations."' 7 The court ex-
plained:
Because the penalty for unsatisfactory participation at
five or more assembly drills is so severe, the Army has pro-
mulgated elaborate procedures to insure that reservists are
promptly notified when their participation in any training
assembly is unsatisfactory ...
. . . If the Army had followed its own regulation, peti-
tioner would have been apprised of his unsatisfactory conduct
in sufficient time to rectify it if so desired before the next
assembly . . ..
The correct procedure is for reservists to be notified after each
absence, not in an aggregate manner after five absences have
been accrued.'9 The writ of habeas corpus requested by Morav-
etz was therefore granted.
That due process does not require the reservist to actually
receive notice was established in Wilson v. United States.0 In
Wilson, constructive notice was held to be sufficient compli-
ance with Marine Corps activation procedures to satisfy due
process. Certified letters containing notice of unsatisfactory
performance were mailed to the reservist's address of record.
The letters were not removed from the addressee's mail box,
however, and were eventually returned to the notifying reserve
unit. In alleging lack of notice the reservist explained that he
had not been living at his home, but was instead living with
his "in-laws." The court upheld the activation, stating that it
was too incredible to believe "that the Wilsons would not have
seen the notices of certified mail in view of their testimony that
they checked for mail at [their home] address at least every
other day while not living there."'
" 349 F. Supp. at 1185. See discussion in text, infra, at part II(A) (3).
,S 349 F. Supp. at 1184.
, See Cruz-Matos v. Laird, 324 F. Supp. 1325 (D.P.R. 1971). There the Army
notified the reservist after each absence, and further notified him of his order to active
duty and right to appeal. The reservist's allegation of a violation of due process was
dismissed by the court.
21 Civil No. 71-2877 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 20, 1972).
21 Id. at 3.
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2. Lack of a Proper Hearing
A frequent claim raised by the involuntarily activated re-
servist is that the absence of a hearing prior to activation
violated a requirement of due process. 2 The cases, however,
have generally held that the military need not hold a formal
hearing prior to the activation. 23 Nevertheless, one service
branch has provided a procedure by which the reservist may
obtain a hearing if he presents his request in a timely fashion.24
The case mounting the first major constitutional attack on
the lack of a formal hearing prior to activation was O'Mara v.
Zebrowski.5 O'Mara had missed numerous drills, allegedly due
to medical reasons, and these excessive absences precipitated
his order to active duty. In a suit to enjoin his activation, he
contended that the Army procedure violated due process in
that no formal hearing was required prior to the unit com-
mander's determination of unsatisfactory performance and rec-
ommendation that the reservist be ordered to active duty.2
Although Army procedures did allow appeal from the active
duty orders, O'Mara argued that the crucial time when a hear-
ing must be allowed is before the recommendation is first for-
"2 See, e.g., Keistor v. Resor, 462 F. 2d 471 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894
(1972); Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972); O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d
1085 (3rd Cir. 1971); Autonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971); Ansted
v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Gianastasio v.
Whyte, 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970); Schatten v. United
States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lonstein, 370 F.2d 318 (2d Cir.
1966) (activation not based on 10 U.S.C. § 673a); Dellaverson v. Laird, 351 F. Supp.
134 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Caruso v.
Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Mielke v. Laird, 324 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.
Wis. 1971); Hickey v. Secretary of the Army, 320 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1971);
Liefermann v. Secretary of the Army, Civil No. 70-858 (D.S.C., Jan. 5, 1971); Sullivan
v. Cushman, 290 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1968).
2 See, e.g., Keistor v. Resor, 462 F.2d 471 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894
(1972); O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 (3rd Cir. 1971); Autonuk v. United States,
445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971); Ansted v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 827 (1971); Gianastasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 941 (1970); Dellaverson v. Laird, 351 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Caruso v.
Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Hickey v. Secretary of the Army, 320
F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1971); Lieferman v. Secretary of the Army, Civil No. 70-858
(D.S.C., Jan. 5, 1971).
24 See AR 135-91(20) (e), as amended Nov. 24, 1970.
25 447 F.2d 1085 (3rd Cir. 1971).
28 Id. at 1088.
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warded. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Van Dusen
writing, held that although "[t]he procedure of Army Reg.
135-91 unquestionably could be improved," it was not constitu-
tionally defective, and the activation was affirmed.Y The
suggestion for improvement, however, appeared to influence
the Army's subsequent decision to amend its regulations to
provide for a hearing. 28
The Sixth Circuit, in a case decided before O'Mara, had
upheld the reservist's claim that he had been denied due pro-
cess. It held in Schatten v. United States25 that the reservist
was entitled to avail himself of the Marine Corps review proce-
dures before final activation. Although the plaintiff had a dual
claim in that he wanted both a hearing and a chance to exhaust
his administrative remedies within the Marine Corps before
activation, the court refused to pass on each separately. In-
stead, the plaintiff was granted relief based on both due process
violations. The court thus left unclear whether there was a
separate right to a hearing. It appeared, however, that the more
influential factor was the arbitrary refusal by the reservist's
commanding officer to grant the plaintiff a chance to appeal
his activation by way of the Article 138 grievance review proce-
dure.3 1 It is important to note that the relief granted was not a
cancellation of the activation orders, but was instead a stay of
the orders pending exhaustion of the review procedures. The
decision only impliedly seemed to require a hearing prior to
activation, and today its apparent import is that one has the
right to exhaust his administrative remedies before being re-
quired to report for duty.
The doubt created by the Sixth Circuit in Schatten was
resolved by that court in Autonuk v. United States.31 In refus-
ing to extend the due process hearing requirement to the ad-
ministrative activation of an Army reservist, the court stressed
' Id. at 1090.
" See AR 135-91, supra note 24.
n 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 190. Article 138, Uniform Code of Military Justice, refers to the procedure
to obtain redress of grievances in the military, and is explained in 10 U.S.C. § 938
(1971). For a discussion of Article 138, see Tompkins, Article 138: A Resurrection, 27
JAG J. 463 (1974).
31 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 63
INVOLUNTARY ACTIVATION OF RESERVISTS
the unique nature of the military. It rested its decision on the
traditional doctrine that discretionary rulings by the military
are beyond the scope of review by civilian courts. 32 In reaching
this conclusion, however, the court did not consider the fact
that this theory's influence has been decreasing in recent
years. 3 Consequently, the plaintiff's claim that the tremen-
dous impact of activation on his life warranted a hearing fell
on deaf ears.
The clearest statement on the issue of whether there is a
constitutional right to a hearing prior to activation is contained
in Keister v. Resor.34 The Third Circuit was again faced with a
due process claim, and it seemed to echo the reasoning of
Autonuk in denying relief:
[The reservist] argues that he is constitutionally entitled to
a hearing. . . . He invokes the fifth amendment right to due
process. In Reaves v. Ainsworth it was stated that, "[To]
those in the military. . . the military law is due process." At
least with respect to the military's internal procedures re-
garding civil matters that pronouncement is as vibrant today
as it was in 1911. . . . More specifically, it has been held that
no constitutional infirmity arises from the absence of a hear-
ing before the involuntary activation of a reservist. 5
Despite the unequivocal position adopted by the majority
of courts that a pre-activation hearing is not constitutionally
mandated, several courts have required hearings under the par-
ticular facts before them. 6 A typical case is Mielke v. Laird.37
1 Id. at 594.
3 See Dilloff, The World of Wigs: Military Reservists and Their Wearing of Short
Hair Wigs, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 161 (1973), in which the author describes the degree
to which courts have delved into the sphere of military appearance requirements, and
the resulting effect on the constitutional rights of the reservist. See also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Two v. United States, 471 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1972)
(court review of military regulations pertaining to conscientious objectors); Ballard v.
Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (sex discrimination in the military). But see
Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974).
U 462 F.2d 471 (3rd Cir. 1972).
Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972); Mellinger v. Laird, 339
F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mielke v. Laird, 324 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Wis. 1971). In
1975]
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There, a federal district court in Wisconsin held that even
though the reservist had no right to personally appear before
the activation board, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his contention that the medical excuse for his last absence,
which had been corroborated by a physician, was arbitrarily
rejected."
The court in Mielke relied on an earlier remand of its
decision in Konn v. Laird." In an unpublished order," the Sev-
enth Circuit had remanded that case for an evidentiary hearing
on Konn's claim that the reserve unit abused its discretion in
absence determinations. The district court then conducted a
full evidentiary hearing into Konn's claim and dismissed the
case on the merits. The appeal from this decision resulted in a
reversal on other grounds.4'
3. Failure of the Service to Follow Its Own Regulations
In White v. Callaway,2 the reservist, White, questioned
whether his unit commander had complied with Army proce-
dures in determining that one of White's absences was "unex-
cused." The significance of such a determination is readily
apparent. If an absence is determined to be the fault of the
reservist, it is recorded as "unexcused" and is included in the
total necessary for involuntary activation. On the other hand,
if the absence is considered "excused," i.e., not the fault of the
reserve member, the absence is not to be counted for that pur-
pose. In White, the pertinent regulations required that the re-
serve unit commander determine whether or not an absence
should be excused.43 The reservist claimed that the determina-
tion in his case was inappropiate because an adequate investi-
Mellinger the court upheld the activation but recognized that a hearing was necessary
even if in the form of an Article 138 hearing instead of the type required by AR 135-91
(20)(e), as amended Nov. 24, 1970.
37 324 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Id. at 166.
31 323 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972).
40 Konn v. Laird, Civil No. 18927 (7th Cir., Dec. 14, 1970).
' See discussion of Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972), in text, infra, at
Part II(A)(3).
42 501 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 Id. at 673.
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gation had not been made." The Fifth Circuit, affirming the
activation, stated that "a good faith review of White's record
and a consideration of the surrounding facts and circumstan-
ces" were required; and that White's commanding officer had
met this requirement even though he had not interviewed
White personally.' The court added:
It would be an improper, ad hoc construction of procedural
niceties for a court to say the Army should have done things
differently here. Holding the Army to its own regulations is
one thing; imputing unnecessary procedural prerequisites
into a regulation is something entirely different."
Failure to follow its regulations was likewise alleged in
Alston v. Schlesinger," where a federal district court found the
plaintiff to be a less than admirable litigant. Alston alleged
that because he had not received notice of his activation, the
military had failed to follow its regulations requiring that the
reservist be notified. Such a failure would be a violation of due
process. However, once the facts were aired in court, it was
discovered that the reservist had not only failed to give his unit
the most recent address where he could be reached, but had
also never picked up his mail. It appeared that Alston had
deliberately neglected to check with the post office since he
knew that the notice letters were there. In effect, the court
found that the reservist was responsible for the lack of notice
by his own failure to act. The court held that the plaintiff
should be ordered to active duty because the service had acted
in a reasonable manner and had not violated due process."
A third case in which it was asserted that the service had
violated its own regulations was Konn v. Laird." There, the
Army attempted to activate the reservist a second time after
an initial attempt failed. The basis for this second attempt was
unexcused absences from drill which had accrued after issu-
anc.e of the initial activation orders. The rule enunciated by the
" Id. at 674.
' Id.
Id.
, 368 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1974).
" Id. at 541.
460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972).
1975]
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Seventh Circuit in upholding the petitioner's claim was that a
reservist is excused from future drill attendance after activa-
tion orders are issued. Subsequent attendance, the court said,
may be required only "when necessary to meet some emergency
or other special need of the reserve unit."5 Thus, absences
accruing after orders are issued may not be used to reactivate
the reservist if the initial orders are revoked, and, conversely,
the only absences which can be counted toward activation are
those which occur before the activation orders are in existence.
4. Right to Appeal
Although the various armed services have treated the right
to appeal an order to involuntary active duty differently, there
appears to be unanimous consent that a means of appeal
should be available to reservists. In the Army, a special board
has been established to handle such appeals-the Involuntary
Active Duty Appeal Board5l-while in the Air Force, Navy
and Marine Corps, the appropriate avenue of redress is to the
superior of the reservist's unit commander via a complaint
under 10 U.S.C. § 938.52
A corollary to any right of appeal is notice of that right to
the aggrieved individual. In the realm of involuntary activa-
tion, it does the reservist no good to have the right of appeal if
he has no knowledge of the right or of the procedures available
to effectuate it. Courts have been quick to recognize this prob-
lem and have seen fit to place the burden of notification on the
particular military service.3 Thus, if a reservist is .unaware of
his right to appeal or is told that there is no such right, his
activation will usually be stayed by the court pending the exer-
-1 Id. at 1320.
, AR 135-91.
52 But see Rasmussen v. Seamans, 432 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1970) (review under Air
Force Manual 35-3 is proper means of redress, not 10 U.S.C. § 938). For cases interpret-
ing the rights of redress under 10 U.S.C. § 938, see Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d
187, 192 (6th Cir. 1969) (Marine Corps); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969) (Air Force); Dellaverson v. Laird, 351 F. Supp. 134
(S.D. Cal. 1972).
" See, e.g., Baugh v. Bennett, 350 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Idaho 1972); Horn v. Musick,
347 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
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cise of his right to utilize the military appeal procedures. 4 In
some cases, however, activation orders have been entirely
voided. 5
The recognized right of an involuntarily activated reservist
to appeal created one procedural issue which was resolved by
the court in Mielke v. Laird .5  The question was whether a
reservist is entitled to personally appear before a review board.
The court rejected the reservist's claimed right to appear before
the Army's Involuntary Active Duty Appeal Board, holding
"that the denial of the right to a reservist's personal appear-
ance before the army review body is not actionable in this
court. '5 It went on to quote from Ansted v. Resor:55
While Army Regulation 135-91 does not provide for a personal
hearing on appeal, it allows the appellant to include in his
appeal in written form all "appropriate evidence which the
applicant may wish to present." We find that this procedure
provided reservist Ansted with sufficient protection of his
constitutional rights and hold that a full personal hearing was
not required as a matter of contractual law or. . .constitu-
tional law."
Even though there is no right to personally appear at an
appeal proceeding, the courts do allow, and indeed have in-
sisted, that written evidence be submitted by the reservist in
his own behalf."' In addition, the individual military branches
have for the most part provided for such a procedure in their
11 See Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969), where a member of a rock band
was activated because he was credited with absences due to his long hair. The Army
had not informed the plaintiff of his right to appeal, as required by regulations, and
had, in fact, told him he had no such right. The court granted a stay of the activation
orders and directed the Army to allow full appeal by the reservist. See also Dellaverson
v. Laird, 351 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (The plaintiff must be given a chance to
appeal his activation before active duty actually commences.).
" See Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); Dellaverson v.
Laird, 351 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
324 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
' Id. at 166.
437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1971).
' Id. at 1024.
See United States ex rel. Sledjeski v. Commanding Officer, 478 F.2d 1147 (2d
Cir. 1973); Wilson v. United States, Civil No. 71-2877 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 20, 1972);
Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
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own regulations."
In Wilson v. United States" the plaintiff was recom-
mended for active duty due to an excessive number of unex-
cused absences from drill. Proper procedures were followed,
with the reservist being notified of his right to appeal; but the
recommendation by the unit commander was withdrawn after
Wilson submitted a statement indicating that he had missed
drills because of his son's illness. Approximately one year later,
Wilson was again recommended for involuntary activation be-
cause he had, in the interim, again accumulated excessive ab-
sences. In his suit, Wilson claimed that he was denied his con-
stitutional rights in that he neither received notice of his acti-
vation nor had an opportunity to submit a statement in his
behalf on appeal. In addressing his right to submit a statement,
the court held that since the plaintiff had been recommended
for activation once before (and therefore presumably had
knowledge of the procedures), and since he had made no at-
tempt to contact his unit or submit a statement in the second
process, he was estopped from raising the argument before the
court.13 Although not expressly stated in the opinion, Judge
Huyett appeared to be applying the equitable "clean hands"
doctrine, with the result that the plaintiff's objections to acti-
vation would not be heard due to his prior misconduct in disre-
garding his contractual obligation to attend drill.64
The courts have placed certain affirmative duties on the
military services to facilitate the appeals of involuntarily acti-
vated reservists. The court in Baugh v. Bennett65 held that
"[w]hen a reservist files an appeal notice which on its face is
insufficient to raise any issue, some further duty is placed on
his superiors to provide means to point out the inadequacies of
the notice ... "66 In addition, the military has a duty to
counsel the reservist on the necessity of presenting adequate
grounds to support the appeal. 7
" See note 5 supra.
62 Civil No. 71-2877 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 20, 1972).
63 Id. at 3.
" Id. at 2.
329 F. Supp. 20 (D. Idaho 1971).
*e Id. at 24.
6Id.
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In United States ex rel. Sledjeski v. Commanding Officer,"6
the Second Circuit placed a related duty on the military. The
Marine Corps regulations required that "Commanding officers
investigate all personal hardship problems or physical defects
claimed by mandatory participants prior to submission of a
recommendation for involuntary active duty."6 In this case,
unlike Baugh v. Bennett, Sledjeski had not filed an appeal;
however, the court granted a stay because ". . . in the absence
of any questioning on the subject [of hardship] the report of
the Marine Corps officers to the Commandant was mislead-
ing."10 Thus, the court specifically held that where a regulation
requires "investigation," there is an affirmative duty placed on
the military branch to inquire into possible objections not
raised by the reservist. The court declined to determine
whether a reservist must always be made aware of his right to
make a claim, however.7' The concurring opinion in Sledjeski,
written by Judge Feinberg, argued that the majority opinion
did not go far enough in this respect. Judge Feinberg stated:
"The majority does not reach the question of whether a reserv-
ist must be advised of his right to make a hardship claim before
his failure to do so may be regarded as a waiver. I would hold
that such notification is required. 72 Judge Feinberg concurred
because the majority's stay allowed Sledjeski the opportunity
to exercise his right to claim hardship.
Although the majority in Sledjeski refused to determine
whether the military was required to inform the reservist of his
legal defenses, the Second Circuit, in Rohe v. Froehlke,73 was
not so hesitant in requiring that the reservist be informed that
he may include in his appeal a rebuttal to any facts in issue.
In Rohe, the circuit court held that the reservist must be al-
lowed to rebut the contents of his military record, and must be
informed that he has a right to do so.7 The court construed
Army Regulation 135-91(20), which authorizes appeal from
U 478 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 1149, quoting Marine Corps Order P 1001 R. 43, 2-102(2) (d).
' Id. at 1150.
71 Id.
n Id. at 1151.
- 500 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1974).
7' Id. at 116.
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involuntary activation, to include the right of reservists to chal-
lenge the basis upon which they were activated as well as the
legality of the activation process itself.75
A similar issue, presented in Feeny v. Smith,76 was
whether the reservist is entitled to inspect his medical record
in preparation for a pre-activation appeal. The reservist
claimed that he was denied a meaningful appeal because the
unavailability of his record prevented him from learning the
basis upon which the Army had activated him. The district
court concluded that the denial of access to records, in conjunc-
tion with an inadequate investigation into the alleged fifth
unexcused absence, constituted a deprivation of due process. 77
In ordering that the activation be vacated, the court stressed
the essential nature of due process in the regulations governing
activation of reservists:
Whatever one may think of the attitude of the petitioner
insofar as his response to his obligation to serve and attend
was concerned, the requirements of the regulation have their
purpose. Essentially, it is to lay the foundation for the very
serious step of ordering a reservist to active duty.71
5. Family Responsibilities and Hardship Claims
The Sledjeski79 case, which was discussed earlier with re-
spect to affirmative duties imposed on the military, is the prin-
cipal case interpreting 10 U.S.C. § 673a(c) (1), the section re-
quiring that consideration be given to family responsibilities
prior to activation. Sledjeski was a Marine Reservist who was
ordered to active duty after he had not only missed his annual
period of active duty training in the summer of 1971 but also
skipped drills in September and October of that year. In his
petition for habeas corpus and relief from activation, Sledjeski
claimed that he was denied due process of law because of the
failure of the Marine Corps to consider his hardship in accord-
ance with its regulations. He alleged that no consideration was
7Id. at n.3.
7 371 F. Supp. 319 (D. Utah 1973).
" Id. at 330.
78 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
79 478 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1973).
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given to the facts that he was married, that his wife had been
recently hospitalized for leg surgery and was unable to work,
and that they had a 16-month-old baby." The position argued
by Sledjeski was that he had not been told and did not know
of his right to claim family hardship until after he had received
his orders to active duty. The court, although not sympathetic
to the plaintiff personally,81 granted relief because it found that
"appropriate consideration" had not been given to his claims,
as was required by the statute.82
The Marine Corps was found to have prevented the reserv-
ist's timely submission of a hardship claim in McSweeney v.
United States.3 In addition to the statute, the Marine Corps
Separations and Retirement Manual, § 6014(2) "requires the
service to inform and assist a member in the preparation of
dependency or hardship discharge."" In McSweeney, the re-
servist received information on his right to claim hardship, but
he was not informed of where the claim should be submitted.
Consequently, McSweeney was prevented from submitting a
claim based on his present status, and the Marine Review
Board activated him on the bases of data that was at least 1
year old.85 Because of this and other factors, 1 the district court
Id. at 1149.
" Id. at 1150.
82 Id.
338 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
s, Id. at 354.
At the time of activation, McSweeney was married, the father of one 19-month-
old child and the expectant father of another, his mother was widowed and his father-
in-law had suffered a heart attack, a broken hip, and had gangrene of both feet. Id. at
351.
, The court was also disturbed by the performance of the Marine Corps in this
case. After having performed satisfactorily for 3 years, McSweeney missed a weekend
drill. His medical excuse, which was corroborated by a physician, was rejected by the
Corps as being untimely submitted; but McSweeney was allowed to make up the
absences by equivalent instruction, and he did so. Later, however, these absences were
used by the Marines to activate the reservist, and the equivalent service was not even
reported in reponse to congressional inquiry:
Two letters, one signed by a Colonel, Deputy Director, and the other signed
by a General, Acting Commandant of the Marine Corps, both containing
serious mistakes having critical bearing on this matter is severely prejudicial
and exemplifies the same lack of exactitude and inadvertence that has char-
acterized this entire proceeding.
338 F. Supp. at 355.
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cancelled the orders and issued a permanent injunction against
the Marine Corps from activating the petitioner.
It should be noted that the relief granted to McSweeney
was tantamount to a judgment on the merits. In contrast to
this conclusive type of relief, more typical decisions have
merely remanded the case for a reconsideration by the service
branch. In McSweeney, the function of the Marine Review
Board was usurped in that the court weighed the plaintiff's
claim and determined that his hardship was so great that he
should not be called to active duty. Such judicial activism in
assuming the fact-finding functions of a military board is fairly
unique in this area of military case law.
Another case in which the reservist was granted relief is
Dellaverson v. Laird . 7 Here, the reservist was not given an
opportunity to submit a written statement explaining his rea-
sons for seeking to be classified as unfit for activation due to
personal family considerations. The court, in setting aside the
activation, found that this opportunity to submit a statement
must be given prior to activation and that the Marine Corps
had failed to comply with its own regulations in this respect.
In those cases where courts have upheld activation in the
face of personal hardship claims, two justifications have been
advanced: (1) the untimely request for consideration of the
claim by the reservist,s and (2) the reluctance of the courts to
interfere in the internal fact-finding of the military.89 In gen-
eral, however, courts have been protective when confronted
351 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
8 See, e.g., Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Sullivan v.
Cushman, 290 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1968).
11 See, e.g., Jolicoeur v. Laird, 462 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1972); Keister v. Resor, 462
F.2d 471 (3rd Cir. 1972); Ansted v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1971); Anderson v.
Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971); Dix v. Rollins, 413 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1969); Byrne
v. Resor, 412 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1969); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969);
Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969); Corona
v. Laird, 357 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Baugh v. Bennett, 350 F. Supp. 1248
(D. Idaho 1972); Schulz v. Resor, 332 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Caruso v. Tooth-
aker, 331 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Mickey v. Barclay, 328 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Krill v. Bauer, 314 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Metz v. United States,
304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968). See
generally Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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with reservists' hardship and family considerations claims. The
human side of activation appears to have been given more
consideration by the courts than mere naked assertions of due
process violations, which only involve the internal activation
process. In sum, it appears easier for the courts to find a viola-
tion of due process, and to intervene accordingly, if some per-
sonal hardship is alleged rather than if only cold legal claims
of lack of notice or hearing are presented.
B. Allegations of Breach of Contract
Involuntarily activated reservists have often argued that
there has been a breach of the enlistment contract by the mili-
tary." The primary event which has generated the breach of
contract allegations is the changing of drill attendance require-
ment by the particular military service. At one time, all of the
services required 90 percent attendance at drill in order for a
reservist to be deemed a satisfactory participant. The Marines,
however, changed to a 100 percent drill attendance require-
ment in 1967,11 while the other services maintained 90 percent
requirements. Some reservists challenging their activation
orders have subsequently attacked this modification as an
unlawful change in their enlistment contract.
In Winters v. United States,"2 the district court rejected
the contract argument, holding that "the imposing of the more
stringent training duty by the regulations operated entirely
within the limits of the pre-existing law." 3 The court also di-
rected this comment to the frustrated reservist:
" See, e.g., Schwartz v. Franklin, 412 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969); Metz v. United
States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Weber v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 491
(E.D. Pa. 1968); In re McBee, 287 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1968); Pfile v. Corcoran,
287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968); Even v. Clifford, 287 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1968);
Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.), a/I'd, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968); Gion v. McNamara, Civil No. 67-1563-EC (C.D. Cal.,
Jan. 9, 1968). See also Dilloff, A Contractual Analysis of the Military Enlistment, 8
U. RICH. L. REv. 121 (1974); Comment, Armed Forces Enlistment: The Use and Abuse
of Contract, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 783 (1972).
gi See Marine Corps Bulletin, MCO P 1001R 43, RESSOP, para. 2052.1 (Mar.
15, 1967).
11 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 896 (1968).
11 Id. at 296.
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The strenuous contention . . . that the Government was
bound by the enlistment contract and [by] the Statement
of Understanding to continue as to the plaintiff the right to
unexcused absence from ten percent of drills in each anniver-
sary year must be rejected as wholly unsound. The Bulletin
of March 15, 1967, is of unquestionable validity, was intended
to apply to plaintiff, and it does apply to him. Since plaintiff
in fact knew of its existence, whether or not it was promul-
gated with due formality it is binding upon him.94
The court in Weber v. United States9 5 reached a similar
conclusion, but found the authority for the change in drill at-
tendance requirements within the contract itself. It cited
Winters with approval9" and held: "The increase in scheduled
drills operated entirely within the limits of the enlistment con-
tract. It contemplated the right to regulate the percentage of
scheduled drills providing it did not violate minimum require-
ments fixed by Congress."97
Yet a third justification for allowing a change in the law
to modify previously existing contracts was formulated in Pfile
v. Corcoran." There, the petitioner alleged that included in his
contract was the then current sanction that a delinquent re-
servist could only be called to active duty for a period not to
exceed 45 days.99 The court concluded that Pfile's contract was
subject to the newly enacted statute, 10 U.S.C. § 673a, because
"[t]he present statute can be regarded as falling within the
'wide discretion' [of Congress'] War Powers, and the statute
appears validly applicable to petitioner, even if it contravenes
his enlistment contract." '
Although the breach of enlistment contract argument has
generally been unsuccessful, in one case the reservist was able
to escape active duty. This occurred in Gion v. McNamara,"'
where the orders were set aside after the court concluded that
Id.
288 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
" Id. at 494.
97 Id.
:8 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968).
1 Id. at 556.
'0 Id. at 561.
,0, Civil No. 67-1563-EC (C.D. Cal., Jan. 9, 1968).
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the Marine Corps' change in drill requirements invalidated the
enlistment contract.
The breach of contract argument has been advanced in
another situation, arising when the period of activation extends
the duty time of the reservist beyond what would have been his
release date absent the activation. The issue becomes whether
the activation takes precedence over the contractual release
date. Two theories have been relied on by the reservist in these
situations. The first addresses the constitutionality of holding
the activated reservist so that he can complete his active duty,
while the second questions whether such action by the military
constitutes a breach of contract. The distinction between the
two theories often fades in the cases as the attacks become
intertwined.
The section of the statute drawing the fire of the reservist
in these cases is 10 U.S.C. § 673a(b), which permits the exten-
sion of an enlistment to allow completion of the involuntary
active duty period. In Fox v. Brown,0 2 this section was pitted
against 32 U.S.C. § 303(d), which provides that "in time of
peace no enlisted man may be required to serve for a period
longer than that for which he enlisted . . . ." The reservist
argued that this statute barred the extension of his release
date. The majority, however, did not agree, as Judge Smith
noted that the right to recall to active duty any reservist who
unsatisfactorily participated in training was established "not-
withstanding any other provision of law." ' 3 The statute was
upheld as constitutional.
In Karpinski v. Resor, °4 the court again upheld the reserv-
ist's extension of duty. It answered the plaintiff's constitutional
argument with the decision in Fox v. Brown,05 and turned
aside his breach of contract plea with the statement that "the
terms of enlistment of a member of the reserve forces, even if
they have the attributes of a contract, are subject to change in
the interest of the national security."'' 6
102 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969).
'' Id. at 841.
419 F.2d 531 (3rd Cir. 1969).
' Id. at 533.
I" Id. For a discussion of enlistment contracts, see Dilloff, A Contractual Analysis
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
There appears to be one particular circumstance concern-
ing enlistment extension in which the military will fail in its
attempt to activate. Such a situation occurred in Musikov v.
Secretary of Defense."°7 There, the plaintiffs orders were "cut"
on October 24, 1972, his enlistment was scheduled to expire on
October 27, 1972, and he received the orders on October 28,
1972. The district court held that the orders became effective
only when received by the reservist, and that in this case the
orders were unenforceable because the plaintiff was no longer
in the military when they were received.
C. Procedural Bars to Judicial Review
Traditionally, federal courts have refrained from exercis-
ing jurisdiction to review military decision-making, except to
determine whether the service has complied with its own regu-
lations."' 8 This laissez-faire policy has encompassed the invol-
untary activation area as well." 9 The basic rationales for this
"nonreviewability" doctrine are twofold: (1) to invade military
decisions would do dishonor to the separation of powers princi-
ple, and (2) the military's needs are unique, and the courts
should avoid interfering in an area with which they are unfa-
miliar. ' The two theories have general applicability because
of the Military Enlistment, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 121 (1974); Comment, Armed Forces
Enlistment: The Use and Abuse of Contract, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 783 (1972).
107 357 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1973).
'o' See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S.
269 (1911); United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d
Cir. 1968).
'" See Jolicoeur v. Laird, 462 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1972); Keister v. Resor, 462 F.2d
471 (3rd Cir. 1972); Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972); Ansted v. Resor, 437
F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1971); Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971); Schatten
v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); Dix v. Rollins, 413 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.
1969); Byrne v. Resor, 412 F.2d 744 (3rd Cir. 1969); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102
(2d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d
837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969); Corona v. Laird, 357 F. Supp.
1357 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Baugh v. Bennett, 350 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Idaho 1972); Schulz
v. Resor, 332 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Caruso v. Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294
(M.D. Pa. 1971); Mickey v. Barclay, 328 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Krill v. Bauer,
314 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D.
Pa. 1969); Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 390 F.2d 879
(2d Cir_), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
,,o See generally Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the
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the military reserves fall within the proper scope of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the government and the reserve
forces are obviously unique to the military.
Almost every involuntary activation case involves a battle
between the reservist, who attempts to avoid the nonreviewa-
bility doctrine by alleging a violation of military regulations,
and the military, which attempts to interpose the traditional
rule. A corollary argument used by the military is that it is in
a separate sphere, and is vested by Congress with wide discre-
tion upon which the court should be reluctant to impinge. Al-
though the arguments of the military have not been universally
dispositive, they have been accorded unanimous lip service by
the courts, and they have often played a supporting role in
those decisions where the courts have barred the reservist's
claims because of procedural deficiencies.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Many involuntary activation cases have been decided on
the basis that the reservist had failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies before turning to the courts."' All services
except the Army, which has its own Involuntary Active Duty
Review Board, provide administrative remedies pursuant to 10
U.S.C. § 938 (Article 138, Uniform Code of Military Justice);
and the courts hold that these avenues of relief must be ex-
hausted before the court will take cognizance of the contro-
versy.' It should be noted, however, that Article 138 has been
held inapplicable to National Guard personnel, and thus this
procedure need not be exhausted prior to guardsmen seeking
Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 48 Mm. L. REv. 91, 145-48 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Sherman].
"I See Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor,
406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 938 (1969); Curtis v. Rost, Civil No. T-5095 (D. Kan., Mar. 17, 1973); Keleher
v. Chaffee, Civil No. 788-72 (D.N.J., Oct. 11, 1972); Mickey v. Barclay, 328 F. Supp.
1108 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Leifermann v. Secretary of the Army, Civil No. 70-858 (D.S.C.,
Jan. 5, 1971). See generally Salcedo v. Lauer, 430 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States ex rel. Berry v. Commanding General, 411 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1969); Morbeto v.
United States, 293 F. Supp. 313 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593
(D. Kan. 1968); Sherman, supra note 110.
I See Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1969).
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
judicial review.113
The pursuit of administrative relief must be sincere and
complete. In Leifermann v. Secretary of the Army' the court
held, inter alia, that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
required that all issues must be raised and passed upon by the
military before any of them can be heard in a civilian court.
The exhaustion must be comprehensive and not merely sym-
bolic in nature.
A classic case applying this doctrine is Mickey v.
Barclay.15 There, a Marine reservist who was familiar with the
necessary administrative procedures nevertheless failed to pur-
sue his case until he was involuntarily activated. He marched
into court claiming that his commanding officer had abused his
discretion in determining absences and recommending activa-
tion. Judge Luongo, in his opinion for the district court, em-
phasized that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to contest
the grievances through administrative channels, and held that,
because he had chosen to ignore the military review available,
he could not now stand before the district court and cry
"Foul."6
A variation on the administrative remedies doctrine ap-
peared in Lizzio v. Richardson.1 '7 The plaintiff, an Army re-
servist, claimed he was medically unfit for active duty because
of a skin condition. However, he had never appeared before the
induction board to allow Army physicians to examine his al-
leged condition. This caused the court to conclude that by not
providing the Army an opportunity to examine him, the reserv-
ist had failed to exhaust his military remedies.118 The court did
not reach the merits of the case.
2. When to Object
There have been two cases in which the reservist chal-
" Rasmussen v. Seamans, 432 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1970).
C' civil No. 70-858 (D.S.C., Jan. 5, 1971).
" 328 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also Herrick v. Cushman, 379 F. Supp.
1143 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
6 328 F. Supp. at 1115.
"1 378 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
, Id. at 989.
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lenged the period of time for which active duty was ordered.
These claims centered upon whether the 2 weeks annual active
duty training should be included in the maximum 24 month
active duty period allowable. In Fox v. Brown,"' the court
stated that any claim in this vein had to be raised while on
active duty, and in Giardina v. Ambrose,' where a National
Guardsman was activated into the United States Army, the
same conclusion was reached.
3. Standing to Object
Once the reservist satisfies jurisdictional requirements,
the courts have been fairly lenient in allowing reservists to
bring their cause to court. Standing, in these cases, is no more
and no less than being able to enter the courthouse door and
raise an objection on the merits. In a strict sense, standing has
not served as the basis for a procedural dismissal of a case, but
it can be said that it has lain at the heart of the nonreview-
ability doctrine.
There are two general rules of standing. First, the threat
of involuntary activation will provide a reservist with standing
and thereby enable him to attack the factual basis behind the
threatened activation. 2' Second, an ex-reservist who is already
on active duty, a fortiori, has standing to attack his activa-
tion.1 2
III. CONCLUSION
Involuntary activation works great changes upon a reserv-
ist's theretofore civilian lifestyle. He is thrust into the military
environment with all of its rigors and variant legal system, 23
"' 402 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969).
12* 301 F. Supp. 326 (D. Mass. 1969).
2I See, e.g., Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Raderman v.
Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 976 (1969); Smith v. Resor,
406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn.),
aff'd, 488 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1973); Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C.
1973); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973).
22 See Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865
(1971); Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970).
I" See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. seq. See generally
H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY 61-76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MOYER].
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and he is usually dislocated from his home and family. Cer-
tainly, attendance at drills and participation in active duty
training are not such demanding requirements that a reservist
should allow himself to become eligible for involuntary activa-
tion. If this is so, why, then, are so many reservists allowing
themselves to become candidates for activation? Is it a failing
in the program itself, a failing in the implementation of the
program, or a defect in the training which the reservist origi-
nally received when he entered the military? Whatever the
reason, it is apparent that these types of cases are best solved
outside the judicial arena. They are internal matters for the
individual military service, and not appropriate for civilian
judges who can better spend their valuable court time else-
where. The only instance in which a court should intervene is
when gross violations of due process are involved; when the
activation was produced by discretionary decisions of a unit
commander with which the reservist differs, the judiciary
should not interfere.
The rationale behind 10 U.S.C. § 673a is that a reservist
needs a minimum amount of annual military training in order
to maintain his readiness for national emergencies. If a reserv-
ist refuses to attend drills and receive training in that manner,
he must be called to active duty to fulfill his obligations and
to guarantee the military readiness requirements. Judicial rec-
ognition of this rationale was apparent in O'Mara v.
Zebrowski,12A in which the court stated: "[T]he primary pur-
pose of involuntary activation appears to be to maintain the
military proficiency that is otherwise maintained by atten-
dance at unit training assemblies.1 ' 25
The nature of involuntary activation has been widely dis-
cussed by courts and commentators.1 2 Their key inquiry ap-
pears to be whether the activation procedure is administrative
or punitive. If activation is to be considered punitive, it is
possible that more stringent procedures, such as a formal hear-
ing, a right to counsel and confrontation of witnesses, would be
124 447 F.2d 1085.
'' Id. at 1089.
'z, See Keister v. Resor, 462 F.2d 471, 475 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894
(1972); MOYER at 75-76.
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required. By characterizing activation as "administrative,"
courts have avoided the procedural safeguards required in a
criminal case; but, despite the language of the court opinions,
activation is punitive in effect if not in name. In fact, in the
most recent treatise on military justice, the section on involun-
tary activation is aptly entitled "Punitive Activation."'27
It is clear from the facts of the cases that the real reason
for removing reservists from their civilian lives is to punish
them for being delinquent reservists. Certainly, no one can
contend that the failure to attend five drills in a year, or the
failure to attend one drill if in the Marine Corps, automatically
necessitates many months of "training" so as to get the reserv-
ist's ability to perform "up to snuff." Moreover, this harsh
remedy for what appears to be a mere infraction of the rules
has not proven to be an effective deterrent to other reservists
seeking to avoid their drills. It is commonly known that reserv-
ists frequently possess a lax attitude toward their duties and
often invent ingenious methods to escape their monthly
penance.
It is the opinion of the author that 10 U.S.C. § 673a pro-
vides a punishment which is disproportionate to the "crime."
It becomes even more punitive when, after failing to report for
duty, reservists are treated as unauthorized absentees and are
subject to apprehension and confinement for being AWOL
from the service.'28 Thus, the penalty can be two-fold: extrac-
tion from civilian life and castigation in military life.
Extra drills or other less severe remedies should be substi-
tuted for the sanctions contained in the federal activation stat-
ute. A delinquent reservist can be made to serve extra hours of
duty at his unit or can be assigned extra work projects. Using
the reservist during the weeknights at hospitals or other public
institutions is a more appropriate remedy.
Not only is the statute too harsh on its face, it can be
unequal in its application because it places vast discretion at
the local reserve unit level. If the commanding officer decides
not to submit a recommendation, then no matter how delin-
' Moyer at 75.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Kilbreth, 22 U.S.M.C.A. 390 (1973).
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quent the reservist is in failing to attend drills or summer
camp, he will not be activated. Thus, the discretion vested at
the 'recommendation stage of the process leads to a nonuni-
formity of treatment among the reservists. This has resulted in
"unit shopping" in some areas, where a reservist seeks to join
the least disciplined unit so as to protect himself if he misses a
few too many drills.
If it must be conceded that the statute will remain, and
will continue to include the harsh remedy of activation, a step
toward uniformity in its application among the services can
still be taken. This can be obtained by standardizing the acti-
vation procedures throughout the services. The need for this
has already been recognized by the office of the Secretary of
Defense, which in 1973 promulgated regulations concerning the
issuance of activation orders.1 29 This regulation, however, falls
far short of the desired goal because it does not enunciate stan-
dard procedures to be applied throughout the activation pro-
cess. For example, it does not address the due process notice
and hearing argument. The regulation only applies when re-
serve members have either performed unsatisfactorily or "have
not fulfilled their statutory reserve obligation."' 30 The problems
experienced by reservists have not arisen after this determina-
tion, but prior to it. Additionally, the new regulation does not
address the lack of uniformity in appellate procedures. 3' By
standardizing the entire activation process, the Department of
Defense would relieve reservists, as well as federal judges, of
the burden of trudging through a maze of complex and often
contradictory regulations. Until new regulations are adopted to
smooth the uneven edges of the activation process and to take
some of the sting out of 10 U.S.C. § 673a, it is safe to say that
the club will remain poised and ready to strike America's delin-
quent "weekend warriors."
1- 32 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-100.3 (1974).
110 Id. at § 100.3(b).
' Establishing an appellate body for all branches of the reserve, similar to the
Army's Involuntary Active Duty Appeal Board, would provide a significant step to-
ward the desired procedual uniformity.
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